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NOTES
INCREASING UNITED STATES INVESTMENT IN FOREIGN
SECURITIES: AN EVALUATION OF SEC RULE 144A
VICKTE KOKKALENIOS
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the financial community has witnessed the increasing
internationalization (or globalization)' of world financial markets. Con-
sistent with this internationalization, United States investment in foreign
securities has increased,2 a trend that financial experts expect will con-
tinue.' Foreign companies have turned to the larger and more sophisti-
cated United States securities markets to raise capital and gain global
recognition.4
Traditionally, however, foreign companies have been, and many still
are, reluctant to offer their securities in the United States, where financial
reporting requirements are much stricter than foreign securities regula-
tions.' Furthermore, the resultant scarcity of foreign securities in the
1. See American Depositary Receipts, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,421 (1991); Bank of
N.Y., Globalization: Its Effect on the Securities Industry, 1 Sec. Issues 1, 1 (June 1990)
[hereinafter Globalization]; Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
an Internationalized Marketplace, in Annual Survey of Financial Services and Regula-
tion, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L Rev. S77, S77-78
(1992); Note, The Capital Markets in Transition: A Response to New SEC Rule 144A, 66
Ind. L.J. 233, 235 n.15 (1990) [hereinafter Capital Markets in Transition] (citing Staff of
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Report to Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and House Comm. on Energy & Commerce Con-
cerning the Internationalization of the Securities Markets (1987)).
2. See American Depositary Receipts, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,421 (1991). It has
been estimated that in 1990 United States investors bought approximately $130.9 billion
and sold approximately $122.5 billion of foreign equity securities. See id. n. I (citing U.S.
Treas. Bull. 93 (Mar. 1991)). These figures can be contrasted with those in 1980, when
United States investors purchased approximately $10.0 billion and sold approximately
$7.9 billion of foreign equity securities. See iUL at 24,421.
3. See id.
4. See McTigue, Looking for a Bigger Market, at 1 (Bank of N.Y. Oct. 1990) (on file
at Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Bigger Market]. In many of these foreign coun-
tries, capital is needed to support recent privatization programs. See i&L For example, to
facilitate Brazil's privatization programs, companies such as Compania de Rio Doce will
be reserving portions of their offerings for distributions made to U.S. institutional inves-
tors under Rule 144A. See Brazil's Privatization Ready to Resume, I Private Placement
Rep. No. 37, Oct. 14, 1991, at 1, *2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUS File. For a
discussion of specific privatization attempts in foreign countries, see Note, The World
Bank and the IMF. At the Forefront of World Transformation, in Annual Survey of Fi-
nancial Services and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Ford-
ham L. Rev. S349, S359-86 (1992).
5. See Demick, Exchanges Want Foreign Listing Eased, Phil. Inquirer, Feb. 22,
1991, at 9-C, col. 1. [hereinafter Exchanges Want Foreign Listing Eased]; Perlman, SEC
Adopts Rule Easing Requirements on Unregistered Securities, Reuter Bus. Rep., Apr. 19,
1990, at *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File [hereinafter SEC Adopts
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United States market has forced United States investors wishing to
purchase foreign securities to buy abroad, often at higher costs.6 In re-
sponse, many professionals in the United States investment arena have
stressed the need for greater accommodation in foreign securities regula-
tion.7 Consistent with this response, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC") has attempted to liberalize and clarify registration
requirements in transnational securities transactions.' On April 30,
1990, the SEC adopted Rule 144A,9 which was intended to provide an
exemption from registration requirements for private'0 resales of re-
stricted securities to qualified institutional investors.'
This Note will examine Rule 144A, the primary regulation that the
SEC has promulgated to respond to the internationalization of the secur-
ities industry.12 Part I provides a general background of the United
Rule]. Foreign companies have been unwilling to offer securities in the United States and
have instead turned to other "less stringent markets" such as Euromarkets. See Toh-
Pantin, SEC Rule Change Seen Boosting U.S. Capital Markets, Reuters, Apr. 20, 1990, at
*1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File [hereinafter Boosting U.S. Capital
Markets.
For example, securities regulation in Japan is much less stringent than in the United
States. See Note, Japanese Securities Regulations: Problems of Enforcement, in Annual
Survey of Financial Services and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the
1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S255 (1992).
6. See SEC Adopts Rule, supra note 5, at "1. As an example, before the Mexican
company Corpacion Industrial Sanluis experimented with American Depositary Receipts
in 1990, United States investors interested in the company had to go to Mexico and
establish trusts for investment purposes. See Bigger Market, supra note 4, at 2.
7. New York Stock Exchange chairman William H. Donaldson has stated that,
rather than force Americans to buy foreign stocks in foreign markets, "we've got to make
some sort of compromise in the name of investor protection." See Exchanges Want For-
eign Listing Eased, supra note 5, at 9-C, col. 3.
United States investors can be expected to put even more pressure on the SEC with the
adoption of the European Community's plan for a uniform economic unit this year,
under which European corporations are expected to flourish. See Globalization, supra
note 1, at 1.
8. In the past several years, the SEC has realized that certain issues regarding the
reach of SEC registration requirements across national boundaries must be resolved. See
Regulation S, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (1990).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1991).
10. Rule 144A applies solely to the private placement market and does not relate to
disclosure requirements for public issuances. A private placement has been defined as
"'a non-registered security placed by an agent with non-bank, third party investors...
hav[ing] a maturity of at least one year.'" Capital Markets in Transition, supra note 1, at
241 (quoting Maher, Is the Party Over?, Inv. Dealers' Dig., Sept. 4, 1989, at 13, 19).
11. See Rule 144A, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933 (1990) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A).
In Rule 144A, eligible investors are called qualified institutional buyers. For a discussion
of the requirements that must be satisfied to be considered a qualified institutional buyer,
see infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
12. Rule 144A is part of SEC efforts to "adapt the more stringent U.S. securities
regulatory environment to the globalization of the capital markets and to achieve greater
harmony with prevailing (and more liberal) regulatory schemes in the European commu-
nity." Cooper, Misperceptions of a Move to Globalization, Pensions & Invs., Oct. 29,
1990, at 16 [hereinafter Misperceptions].
For a discussion of more recently proposed changes in United States securities regula-
tions, see Note, Securities Exchange Commission's Proposed Regulations of Foreign Secur-
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States securities markets and their position in the international securities
industry. This Part also discusses the adoption of Rule 144A and the
conditions that must be satisfied for its use. Part H then reviews recent
market results under Rule 144A and addresses criticisms of the Rule.
Finally, this Note concludes that an amended Rule 144A is needed to
make the United States more competitive internationally. 3
I. BACKGROUND
A brief review of the different markets in the United States relevant to
the adoption of Rule 144A and the role of the SEC in regulating these
markets will aid in an understanding of the Rule. This review indicates
that the SEC needed to adopt Rule 144A in response to globalization of
financial markets and to differences in international securities regula-
tions. Finally, the requirements for eligibility under Rule 144A are
presented.
A. The SEC and United States Securities Markets
The SEC is the federal agency that seeks to regulate and "maintain[
the efficiency and integrity of the American securities markets."' 4 The
SEC regulates the actions of issuers in offering securities'" publicly or in
making private placements.
Publicly-held securities "are traded both on formal securities ex-
changes and in the more loosely organized 'over-the-counter' markets."' 6
Because participants in public-market trading are often relatively unso-
phisticated, disclosure requirements for public offerings are extensive.
ities Issued in the United States, in Annual Survey of Financial Services and Regulation,
Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S203 (1992) [herein-
after SEC's Proposed Regulations].
13. For a discussion of specific changes the SEC should address to further increase
the effectiveness of Rule 144A, see infra notes 87-128 and accompanying text.
14. T. Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 9 (1985). In the United States, there
are six federal securities acts. See id at 10. One of these, the Securities Act of 1933,
regulates the distribution of securities. See iL at 254. Another, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, "charges the SEC with the authority to supervise daily market activity." Id
15. The term "security" is defined, under the Securities Act of 1933, as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, cer-
tificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities ... or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into
on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
16. Hazen, supra note 14, at 3.
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Specifically, an issuer that offers its securities in the public market must
comply with the registration requirements set out in Section 5 of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 (" '33 Act"),17 which, absent an exemption,' 8 re-
quires an issuer to file and secure approval of a registration statement in
order to offer or sell securities. 9 This broad disclosure requirement
stems from one of the underlying policies of United States securities reg-
ulation-that disclosure is necessary whenever securities are issued in the
United States in order to protect United States investors.20
Private placements, on the other hand, are exempt from the Section 5
registration requirements pursuant to Section 4(2).21 In addition to af-
fording issuers an exeffiption from onerous registration requirements, the
private placement market provides other advantages over public offer-
ings.22 In fact, since the 1980s the private placement market has signifi-
cantly challenged the public markets-a change that has transformed the
United States capital markets.23
B. Globalization of Capital Markets
The recent trend toward globalization of financial markets has resulted
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. 1, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988)).
18. See Hazen, supra note 14, at 6.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1988).
20. See Capital Markets in Transition, supra note 1, at 247 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933)). This policy, "that no essentially important element at-
tending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public," was an underlying principle
behind the adoption of the '33 Act. Id.
"Disclosure has always been at the heart of our system of federal securities regulation."
Doty, supra note I, at S86. Many financial professionals have emphasized the SEC's
concern that, in adopting its policies, it must not sacrifice this principle of investor pro-
tection. See, eg., Boosting U.S. Capital Markets, supra note 5, at *2 (quoting Vice Presi-
dent Sherman of Shearson Lehman Hutton, noting that in increasing access to United
States capital markets, the SEC must not to sacrifice investor protection); Greene &
Beller, Rule 144A: Keeping the U.S. Competitive in the International Financial Markets, 4
L. & Bus. Insights (P-H) No. 6, June 1990, at 3, *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NWLTRS File (deregulatory actions are permitted by the SEC when it concludes that
they "do not jeopardize the necessary protection of U.S. investors and markets") [herein-
after Keeping the U.S. Competitive].
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988) (codifying Section 4(2) of the '33 Act).
22. In addition to allowing foreign companies to circumvent the extensive Section 5
disclosure requirement for public issues, a private placement is also cheaper than a public
issue in terms of administrative and transaction costs. See Shaking Up America's Capital
Markets, Economist, Apr. 21, 1990, at 89 [hereinafter Shaking Up America's Capital
Markets]. For example, fees for a $25 million public issuance could amount to $500,000
in "[flees for investment banks, lawyers and rating agencies." Id. A private issue, on the
other hand, "could cost less than one-third of that [amount]." Id.
Private placement deals can also be completed in a much shorter time than public
offerings, usually a few days or weeks, while mere registration of public issues can take a
few months. See id. Furthermore, private placements can be "tailored to fit the buyers'
requirements" as compared to the "off-the-peg nature of public issues." Id.
23. In 1981, the total dollar amount of securities placed privately in the United States
was $18 billion. See Capital Markets in Transition, supra note 1, at 242. This figure
increased to $139 billion in 1987 and $202 billion in 1988. See id.
S182 [Vol. 60
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in a dramatic change in the world marketplace.2' Although the United
States capital market has been the strongest, other markets have in-
creased in importance and strength. 5 These other markets now provide
numerous attractions26 to investors and have provided significant compe-
tition to the United States market. In recent years, United States inves-
tors also have gone abroad either to diversify their portfolios or to
purchase certain securities that were not available in the United States."
In light of globalization and competition among world markets, there has
been increased pressure on the SEC to ensure that the United States
maintains a competitive position in the international securities indus-
try.2" Both foreign issuers and United States investors have advocated
easing United States disclosure requirements 29 in order to compete with
those in less restrictive foreign markets.30
C. Rule 144A as a Response to Globalization
1. Background
At present, a foreign company seeking to issue securities in the United
24. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
25. See Fuerbringer, Investors' Hopes Overseas Shaded by Doubt, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2,
1992, at Dl, col. 1. Among the largest world markets, the United States came out on top
for 1991, rising 27.44%. See id. at Dll, col. 3. Other markets---both larger and less
developed-performed rather well in 1991 and previous years. Of leading markets,
France was up 14.18%, in dollar terms, and Britain 11.87%. See id. In Mexico, a coun-
try which has recently undergone extensive economic reforms, the market has led the
Financial Times index of 24 markets for the past four years, and in 1991 that market was
up 138.03%, in dollar terms. See id.
26. For one, the Euromarkets are generally less stringent in reporting requirements
than the United States capital market. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. In addi-
tion, because of internationalization, there has been "increased competition among coun-
tries to establish 'major' securities trading centers.... [to] offer 'easy' regulation of
securities professionals, [and] 'innovative trading structures,'" and to facilitate access to
such markets for foreign companies. See Need for Disclosure Rule Changes Debated at
NASAA Annual Meeting, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1592 (Nov. 1, 1991)
[hereinafter Need for Disclosure Rule Changes].
27. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the interests of U.S.
investors, including both small ones and also large institutions, in the stocks of foreign
companies, see American Depositary Receipts, Economist, June 15, 1991, at 73 [hereinaf-
ter American Depositary Receipts, Fidler, ADR Trading Volumes on U.S Exchanges Rise
25%, Fin. Times, Feb. 27, 1991, § 1, at 31, col. 6 [hereinafter ADR Trading Volumes on
U.S. Exchanges Rise 25%].
28. See Keeping the US Competitive, supra note 20, at *2. In fact, some investors see
Rule 144A as being so effective as to potentially threaten Euromarkets. See Miller, New
U.S. Securities Rule Threatens Euromarkets, Reuters, June 1, 1990, at *1, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File [hereinafter Rule Threatens Euromarkets]. Invest-
ment bankers expected that once the United States capital markets were changed under
Rule 144A to reflect the more advantageous characteristics of the Euromarkets, issuers
would turn to this "largely untapped investor base that could draw big-time issues." Id.
at *1. Another said this could mean a "tremendous change in the way Japanese firms
raise funds." Id (statement by an official at Japanese Nikko Securities Co. Ltd.).
29. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text; infra notes 102-103 and accompany-
ing text; Doty, supra note 1, at S86-87.
30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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States public markets must either provide full disclosure31 or obtain an
exemption.32 The disclosure requirements for a public offering have lim-
ited the number of public offerings made in the United States by foreign
companies.33 Prior to the adoption of Rule 144A, however, the private
placement market was not an adequate alternative.34 The private place-
ment market was relatively illiquid,35 which made issuing securities in
the United States expensive-more so than in the Euromarkets to which
many foreign companies have turned.36
In an attempt to keep the United States competitive internationally,37
the SEC adopted Rule 144A. The SEC adopted the Rule in response to
the trend toward globalization and to take advantage of two other trends
in the United States capital markets-the increasing role of institutional
investors and the increasing importance of the private placement mar-
ket.38 Although Rule 144A liberalizes disclosure requirements, the SEC
concluded that the Rule would not jeopardize the necessary protection of
United States investors and markets. 39 Rule 144A protects the United
States investor by limiting the group of eligible institutional investors
40
31. A foreign company could satisfy the disclosure requirement by fully reporting on
Form 20-F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Bank of N.Y., American Deposi-
tary Receipts, Rule 144A & Regulation S Regulatory Developments Impacting ADRs, at 2
(1990) [hereinafter Impacting ADRs].
32. See id. Issuers often use the exemption in Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-
2(b) (1991). See Hanks & Bushner, Rule 12g3-2(b): Backdoor or Trapdoor?, Int'l Fin. L.
Rev., Apr. 1991, at 1.
Rule 12g3-2(b), first introduced in 1967, provides an exemption to the '33 Act registra-
tion requirements by "permit[ting] non-[U.S.] companies to rely on home country disclo-
sure to fulfil [U.S.] requirements." Id. Despite the goal of United States securities
regulation to protect United States investors, this exemption was allowed to accommo-
date the interests of foreign companies. See id. In order to obtain a 12g3-2(b) exemption,
a foreign issuer must provide certain specified information to the SEC as soon as it is filed
or disclosed in the issuer's home country. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1)(i) (1991).
The Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption can be used to satisfy the information requirement under
Rule 144A. See Impacting ADRs, supra note 31, at 2.
33. See Boosting U.S. Capital Markets, supra note 5, at * 1.
34. See id. Foreign companies have not been permitted to issue their securities in the
U.S. private placement market, although their securities can be traded in that market
after the initial offering. See id.
35. See Perlman, SEC Rule May Be First Step To Changing How Securities Are Sold,
Reuter Bus. Rep., Apr. 18, 1990, at *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File
[hereinafter SEC Rule May Be First Step]. Illiquid securities have been defined as those
that are "not readily convertible into cash ... [and] that [are] not traded actively and
would be difficult to sell at once without taking a large loss." Barrons Dictionary of
Finance and Investment Terms (1987).
36. See Shaking Up America's Capital Markets, supra note 22, at 89.
37. The SEC's desire to maintain a competitive position for the United States in the
world financial markets is indicated in the statement by Richard Breeden, the chairman
of the SEC, that he foresees the SEC playing the role of world's securities policeman. See
American Depositary Receipts, supra note 27, at 73.
38. See Capital Markets in Transition, supra note 1, at 235-36.
39. See Keeping the U.S. Competitive, supra note 20, at *2.
40. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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and the types of securities that are afforded the 144A exemption.4 Fur-
thermore, Rule 144A still maintains a disclosure requirement, even
though it is less extensive than for public offerings.4"
There were two essential reasons why foreign issuers were reluctant to
issue their securities in the United States. First, the requirements and
structures of the United States capital markets deterred foreign issuers
from entering those markets.43 Second, prior to Rule 144A's adoption,
resale procedures in both the private and public markets were burden-
some. In the private placement market in particular, these procedures
were cumbersome and expensive,' leading issuers and investors to avoid
that market.45 This avoidance contributed to the market's illiquidity.'
Furthermore, according to SEC Rule 144,' 7 unregistered securities could
not be resold in a public offering unless they were held for at least two
years.
48
Thus, the SEC sought a rule that would attract foreign issuers through
the use of a market (the "144A market") that required limited disclosure
and that also allowed issuers to trade privately placed securities more
freely.49 Rule 144A was designed to meet this need by exempting the
41. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
44. See Impacting ADRs, supra note 31, at 1. Prior to Rule 144A's adoption, resale
procedures were decided on a case-by-case basis in SEC no-action letters. See id. A no-
action letter generally is used to describe: (1) the favorable and unfavorable responses to
private requests to SEC staff recommending that certain securities transactions not be
prosecuted; and (2) staff advisory and interpretive positions that answer private inquiries.
See Schneider, infra note 50, at 502 n.12.
45. See SEC Rule May Be First Step, supra note 35, at *1.
46. See id
47. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1991).
48. See id § 230.144(d).
49. The SEC and other experts in the financial industry expected that, with the ex-
emption of resales of certain securities in the United States from SEC registration require-
ments, foreign issuers would turn to the United States markets to raise capital. See
Proposed Rule 144A, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,076, 30,077 (1989); Eichenwald, Private Placement
Off to a Slow Start, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1991, at D10, col. 2 [hereinafter Slow Start].
When the SEC proposed Rule 144A, it requested comments from experts and investors
whose opinions it intended to follow. See Proposed Rule 144A, 54 Fed. Reg. at 30,076,
30,078 (1989). Most agreed that, under the Rule, the efficiency and liquidity of the pri-
vate placement market would increase, thus attracting foreign and domestic issuers. See
iad at 30,077.
Furthermore, the Rule eases resale procedures. Under the Rule, eligible institutions
can resell securities to each other within the two- to three-year period necessary before a
public resale can be made. See Impacting ADRs, supra note 31, at 2. By allowing inves-
tors to turn to the private placement market instead of waiting two to three years to resell
securities in the public market. it was believed that the liquidity of the private placement
market would increase while financing costs for issuers would decrease. See SEC Rule
May Be First Step, supra note 35, at *1.
In addition to adopting Rule 144A, the SEC amended Rule 144 to allow tacking of
subsequent holdings of securities, in most instances, to meet the two- to three-year re-
quirement. See Rule 144A, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933, 17,941-42 (1990) (amendment codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144). This change should accelerate the movement of previously re-
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resale of privately placed securities from registration under the '33 Act.
The registration exemption provided by Rule 144A is promulgated pur-
suant to the Section 4(1) and 4(2) exemptions of the '33 Act. 0
2. The Requirements Under Rule 144A
In order to qualify for the Rule 144A exemption, four conditions must
be satisfied.51 First, only certain limited institutions, known as qualified
institutional buyers ("QIBs"), can purchase the resales. s2 QIBs are insti-
tutions or broker-dealers registered under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (" '34 Act"), that own and invest at least $100 million, or $10 mil-
lion in the case of broker-dealers, in securities not affiliated with that
institution. 3 In addition to meeting the $100 million requirement, a
bank or savings and loan institution, to qualify as a QIB, must have a net
worth of at least $25 million.' Second, the seller must reasonably ensure
that the buyer knows that the seller is relying upon the Rule 144A ex-
emption from the '33 Act's registration requirements."5 Third, prospec-
stricted securities into the public market since resales could be made in a shorter time.
See Rule 144A Proposing Release, 53 Fed. Reg. 44,016, 44,033 (1988)).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l)-(2) (1988) (codifying Sections 4(1) and 4(2) of the '33
Act). Prior to the adoption of Rule 144A, a holder of restricted securities who wished to
sell them privately without registering under the '33 Act had to rely on a combination of
the principles in these two sections, commonly referred to as the "'Section 4(1-1/2)'"
exemption. Schneider, Section 4(1-1/2)-Private Resales of Restricted or Control Securi-
ties, in Symposium: Current Issues in Securities Regulation, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 501, 501
(1988). Section 4(2) exempts from registration "transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988). Section 4(1) of the Act exempts from
registration "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 15
U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1988). Therefore, because these transactions involved private place-
ments and because a holder of a secondary sale is presumably not an issuer, the exemp-
tion applied as long as such holder was not a dealer or underwriter. See Schneider, supra,
at 503. The 4(1-1/2) exemption used prior to Rule 144A proved to be complex and
cumbersome. Often, therefore, investors would not undergo wide marketing activities
and "would offer securities only to a limited number of potential buyers." Glover, Right
Rules, Wrong Timing: The SEC's Spurs to Offshore Trading and Private Placement Re-
sale Aren't Playing in this Economy, Recorder, Jan. 22, 1991, at *2, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, PAPERS File [hereinafter Right Rules, Wrong Timing]. Furthermore,
investors would frequently have to ask for a covenant stating that the buyer would not
resell the securities without registering them or obtaining an exemption. See id.
Rule 144A purports to eliminate the confusion in the Section 4(1-1/2) exemption by
"explicitly exempting" resales made under the Rule. See Capital Markets in Transition,
supra note 1, at 253 (emphasis added).
51. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d) (1991).
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(1) (1991). At present, approximately 3,300 institu-
tions are eligible to use Rule 144A. See Impacting ADRs, supra note 31, at 4. Many of
these include pension funds. See Boosting U.S. Capital Markets, supra note 5, at * 1.
Others include insurance companies. See Bavaria, Thumbs Up for Rule 144,4, According
to SEC Report, Inv. Dealers' Dig., Nov. 4, 1991, at 10 [hereinafter Thumbs Up for Rule
144.4].
53. See Rule 144A, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933, 17,936 (1990) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144A).
54. See id. To ensure that United States banks are not at a competitive disadvantage,
this net-worth requirement applies to both foreign and domestic banks. See id.
55. See id. at 17,939 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(2)).
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five purchasers must be able to obtain, at their request, certain financial
information from issuers.56 This information requirement is unneces-
sary, however, if the issuer files reports under the '34 Act,17 maintains a
12g3-2(b) exemption by providing home-country disclosure,5" or is a for-
eign government.5 9 Finally, only non-fungible securities are eligible for
the Rule 144A exemption.' °
II. RESULTS AND CRITICISMS OF RULE 144A
With the adoption of Rule 144A, the SEC, commentators, and inves-
tors predicted an increase in issuance of European securities in the
United States as more companies turned to the United States private
placement market to raise capital.6" Since its adoption, however, Rule
56. See id. at 17,938 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)). This financial informa-
tion entails "a very brief statement of the nature of the business of the issuer and the
products and services it offers; and the issuer's most recent balance sheet and profit and
loss and retained earnings statements, and similar financial statements for such part of
the two preceding fiscal years as the issuer has been in operation (the financial statements
should be audited to the extent reasonably available)." 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4))
(1991).
Rule 144A also demands that the information be "reasonably current." See id.
§ 230.144A(d)(4)(ii). This requirement is presumed to be satisfied on two conditions.
First, the provided balance sheet must be dated at most 16 months prior to the resale, and
the provided income statement and, second, the statement of the nature of the business
must be for the 12 months preceding the resale. See id. § 230.144A(d)(4)(ii)(A)-(B); see
also Longstreth, Beekman & Rich, Rule 144A: A Closer Look, 4 L & Bus. Insights (P-H)
No. 8, Aug. 1990, at 16, *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NWLTRS File (discuss-
ing the controversy over this requirement) [hereinafter A Closer Look]. Second, for for-
eign private issuers, the information must meet the "timing requirements of the issuer's
home country or principal trading markets." 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(ii)(C).
57. If an issuer reports, under the '34 Act, to agencies other than the SEC, it may
resell its securities without providing any further information. See Rule 144A, 55 Fed.
Reg. 17,933, 17,939 n.52 (1990) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A) (citing Section 120)
of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(i)).
58. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i) (1991). For a discussion of the requirements
under Rule 12g3-2(b), see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
59. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i) (1991).
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3) (1991). Non-fungible securities are securities not
of the same class as securities listed on a United States exchange or quoted on an auto-
matic inter-dealer quotation system such as NASDAQ. See Rule 144A, 55 Fed. Reg.
17,933, 17,935 (1990) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3)). Securities will be consid-
ered of the same class "if they are of substantially similar character and the holders
thereof enjoy substantially similar rights and privileges." Id For preferred equity securi-
ties, "same class" is indicated by "substantially identical" terms regarding, among others,
dividend rate, cumulation, voting rights, and redemption. See id For debt securities, the
"same class" is indicated by "substantially identical" terms regarding, among others, in-
terest rate, maturity, security, and redemption. See id.
Although 144A securities cannot be listed on United States exchanges or NASDAQ,
they may be traded side by side with over-the-counter securities. See Bank of N.Y., Ques-
tions & Answers: Rule 144A, 1 Sec. Issues 2, 2 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter Questions &
Answers: Rule 144A].
61. See supra notes 37-48. Rule 144A was intended to make the U.S. capital markets
more attractive than the Euromarkets. See Rule Threatens Euromarkets, supra note 28,
at *1. By increasing its liquidity, the United States private placement market would then
have approximately the same costs and disclosure requirements as the Euromarkets. See
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144A has been met with a mixture of both praise and criticism. Support-
ers of the Rule have generally focused on how it has increased the
number of foreign securities placed in the United States.62 Critics, on the
other hand, have suggested amendments to Rule 144A to further expand
the 144A market.63
A. The Increased Number of Foreign Securities Placed in the United
States Under Rule 144A
Within the last year, nineteen foreign companies raised approximately
$700 million through 144A private placements." In fact, a recent report
indicates that in 1991, "Rule 144A issuers from [fourteen] countries ac-
counted for [fifty-two percent] of the [private placement] market's debt
by dollar volume."
61
One way in which Rule 144A has been utilized is in conjunction with
another important investment tool-the American Depositary Receipt
("ADR").66 In recent years, the trading of ADRs has increased signifi-
cantly.67 Issuing ADRs publicly has proven advantageous for companies
id. Under Rule 144A, the costs of private placements would decrease as transaction costs
and liquidity premiums dropped. See Capital Markets in Transition, supra note 1, at 261.
American Stock Exchange chairman James Jones described Rule 144A as "'a step
forward [that] paves the way for the development of a network to facilitate this type of
securities activity.'" See SECAdopts Rule, supra note 5, at *2. At least one commenta-
tor has heralded the Rule as the most important step in the past twenty years to enable
the U.S. to become more competitive. See Boosting U.S. Capital Markets, supra note 5, at
*1.
62. See Citibank and Rule 144A, 1 Private Placement Rep. No. 29, Aug. 19, 1991, at
6, *2 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUS File; Thumbs Up for Rule 144A, supra note
52, at 10. For a discussion of recent Rule 144A benefits for foreign issuers and United
States investors, see infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 87-128 accompanying text.
64. See American Depositary Receipts, supra note 27, at 73. "Privately-placed debt
issued under [SEC] Rule 144A rose to [$]23 billion.., in 1991 from [$]12 billion.., for
the nine months of 1990 in which the new rule was in effect." U.S. 144A Private Place-
ments Up Sharply in 1991, Reuters, Mar. 4, 1992, at *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, WIRES File [hereinafter U.S. 144A Private Placements Up].
65. U.S. 144A Private Placements Up, supra note 64, at * 1.
66. ADRs are certificates representing ownership of foreign securities. See American
Depositary Receipts, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,421 & n.5 (1991). ADRs provide several
advantages for foreign issuers. First, because ADRs are treated as United States securi-
ties, those institutions that are prohibited from investing in non-U.S. securities are able to
"enjoy the benefits of an internationally diversified portfolio" without violating such
prohibitions, which are often in their charters. Citibank Answers Questions on Rule 144A
Market, 1 Private Placement Rep. No. 28, Aug. 12, 1991, at 6, *2, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, BUS File [hereinafter Citibank Answers Questions]. In addition, foreign
companies, such as many of those in Mexico, often use ADRs as a way to gain recogni-
tion before making an offering. See Bigger Market, supra note 4, at 2.
67. See American Depositary Receipts, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,421 n.2 (1991). ADR
trading, including that on the over-the-counter market, has been estimated at approxi-
mately $125 billion in 1990. See id. (citing Bank of N.Y., 1990 ADR Mkt. Rev. & Year
End Newsl. (Feb. 1991)). Excluding over-the-counter trading, ADR trading was valued
at approximately $75 billion in 1990 and $60 billion in 1989. See ADR Trading Volumes
on U.S. Exchanges Rise 25%, supra note 27, at 31, col. 6. Furthermore, it has been
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that seek name recognition and a broad range of investors.68 For compa-
nies that merely seek to raise capital, Rule 144A has provided a less ex-
pensive route than public offerings,69 and thus has further increased the
volume of ADR trading.7" When an issuer sells ADRs in the Rule 144A
market, as opposed to the United States public markets, it obtains the
Rule 144A registration exemption."
Issuers have also used Rule 144A in conjunction with Regulation S,1
which the SEC adopted on May 2, 1990. The SEC intended Regulation
S to help clarify the application of the registration requirements of the
'33 Act in international transactions.7 3 In addition, Regulation S estab-
estimated that in the first half of 1991, $42.8 billion of ADRs were traded. See Bank
Expects 144A ADR Issuance to Keep Growing, 1 Private Placement Rep. No. 33, Sept. 16,
1991, at 3, *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUS File. In those six months, ap-
proximately $476 million of ADRs were issued under Rule 144A. See id.
For a discussion of SEC proposed regulations to further ease ADR registration and
filing requirements in order to increase their trading, see SEC's Proposed Regulations,
supra note 12, at 5203.
68. See Bigger Market, supra note 4, at 2.
69. See id.
70. See Citibank Answers Questions, supra note 66, at * 1. An interesting route was
taken by the Singapore shipbuilder Koepel, which made a 144A offering and afforded
buyers the option of purchasing ADRs or Singapore shares. See Bigger Market, supra
note 4, at 2 (emphasis added).
71. See Bigger Market, supra note 4, at 2.
72. Regulation S, 55 Fed. Reg 18,306 (1990).
73. See id. Prior to the adoption of Regulation S, offshore planning of securities re-
lied on SEC no-action letters, which proved tedious and expensive.
Offshore planning also relied on an outdated release for safe harbors. See Coogan &
Kimbrough, Regulation S Safe Harbors For Offshore Offers Sales and Resales, 4 L &
Bus. Insights (P-H) No. 8, Aug. 1990, at 3, *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
NWLTRS File [hereinafter Regulation S Safe Harbors]. Under the pertinent release, Re-
lease No. 33-4708, securities sold in reliance on its safe harbor could not be sold or
offered to a person in the United States, nor for the benefit of a United States person, for
one year. See Staff Issues Interpretation of Regulation S Resale Safe Harbor, 22 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1503 (Oct. 19, 1990) [hereinafter Staff Issues Interpretation].
Furthermore, the release imposed transfer restrictions on the resales and required that
issuers monitor them to assure compliance with its provisions. See id
In its General Statement, Regulation S now provides that the Section 5 registration
requirements-that all sales offerings be registered-do not include offers and sales of
securities outside the United States. See Regulation S, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306 (1990). Prior
to the adoption of Regulation S, SEC policy was that the Section 5 requirements applied
to any offers made to United States investors, regardless of whether the investors were in
the United States or overseas at the time of the sale. See Staff Issues Interpretation, supra,
at 1503. The SEC felt that, consistent with the expansion of global markets, Regulation S
should allow participants in offshore transactions to rely on the laws of their home coun-
try. See Regulation S, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (1990).
In determining what constitutes an offer or sale outside the United States, Regulation S
requires the satisfaction of two conditions. Under the first condition, all offers and sales
must be made in "offshore transactions." See Regulation S, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18309
(1990). To constitute an offshore transaction, no offer can be made to persons in the
United States and either: (1) the buyer must be (or at least the seller must believe that the
buyer is) offshore when the buy order originates; or (2) if relying on the issuer safe har-
bor, the sale must be made through the facilities of an offshore securities market; or (3) if
relying on the resale safe harbor, the sale must be made through the facilities of an off-
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lished two "safe harbors"-an issuer safe harbor and a resale safe har-
bor-for offshore transactions.74 In establishing these safe harbors, the
shore securities market and the transaction cannot be prearranged with a buyer in the
United States. See id. at 18,309-10.
The following markets, as of May 1990, were included by the SEC within the definition
of "designated offshore securities markets:"
the Eurobond market, as regulated by the Association of International Bond
Dealers; the Amsterdam Stock Exchange; the Australian Stock Exchange; the
Bourse de Bruxelles; the Frankfurt Stock Exchange; The Stock Exchange of
Hong Kong Limited; The International Stock Exchange of the United King-
dom and the Republic of Ireland, Ltd.; the Johannesburg Stock Exchange; the
Bourse de Luxembourg; the Borsa Valori di Milan; the Montreal Stock Ex-
change; the Bourse de Paris; the Stockholm Stock Exchange; the Tokyo Stock
Exchange; the Toronto Stock Exchange; the Vancouver Stock Exchange; and
the Zurich Stock Exchange.
Id. at 18,310 n.46. These markets had been designated as ready markets under Rule
153-1 of the '34 Act. See id.
Under the second condition, there must be no "directed selling efforts" in the United
States relating to the offers or sales. See id. at 18,310-11. Directed selling efforts are
activities made for the purpose of, or that could reasonably result in, conditioning the
market in the United States for the securities being offered. See id. at 18,311. Directed
selling efforts include:
marketing efforts in the United States designed to induce the purchase of the
securities purportedly being distributed abroad. Activities such as mailing
printed materials to U.S. investors, conducting promotional seminars in the
United States, or placing advertisements with radio or television stations broad-
casting into the United States or in publications with a general circulation in the
United States.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
As an example of how the SEC has interpreted this definition, a no-action letter which
reviewed whether the activities of a Canadian company, Coral Gold Corp., would be
considered directed selling efforts, stated that advertisements were excluded from the cat-
egory of directed selling efforts "provided [they] contain] no more information than is
legally required and includeol a statement to the effect that the securities have not been
registered under the 1933 Act and may not be sold in the United States." Coral Gold
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, at *3 (Feb. 19, 1991), available in LEXIS, Secreg Library,
NOACT File. There, a circular filed with the SEC was not considered a directed selling
effort even though it was available to the public. See id. at * 1, *3.
Additionally, Regulation S states that legitimate selling activities, such as those relying
on Rule 144A, do not constitute directed selling efforts. See Regulation S, 55 Fed. Reg.
18,306, 18,312 & n.64 (1990). This statement by the SEC has allowed Rule 144A and
Regulation S to be used simultaneously in two-tranche operations. See infra notes 76-78
and accompanying text.
74. See Regulation S, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,307 (1990).
The issuer safe harbor can be used by issuers, distributors, their respective affiliates,
and their agents. See id. at 18,313. This safe harbor identifies three categories of securi-
ties and imposes restrictions on the offered securities coming to rest offshore. See id.
The first category includes foreign issuers with no substantial United States market
interest in the securities, certain overseas directed offerings, securities of foreign govern-
ments, and employee benefit plans. See id. Offerings of these securities "need not be
registered and there is no seasoning period before U.S. investors can buy [them]." Im-
pacting ADRs, supra note 31, at 3 (emphasis in original). The second category consists of
securities of United States or foreign reporting issuers, debt securities of non-reporting
foreign issuers, non-participating preferred stock and asset-backed securities. See Regu-
lation S, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,315 (1990). Offerings of these securities "need not be
registered, but there is a 40 day seasoning period before U.S. investors can buy them."
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SEC further reduced restrictions applicable to foreign companies."5
Using Rule 144A in conjunction with Regulation S has led, as the SEC
expected,76 to an increase in the number of foreign securities placed in
the United States.77 Indeed, most of the 144A transactions that have
taken place in the United States have been two-part transactions where a
foreign issuer established a listing on a European securities market but
also placed a securities in the United States, thereby tapping into United
States capital markets without going through the maze of SEC rules and
regulations.78
Impacting ADRs, supra note 31, at 3 (emphasis in original). The final category consists of
"[n]on-reporting U.S. issuers [and] equity offerings by non-reporting foreign issuers with
substantial U.S. market interest." Regulation S, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,318 (1990).
These offerings "need not be registered, but there is a one year seasoning period before
U.S. investors can buy [them]." Impacting ADRs, supra note 31, at 3 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
The resale harbor is available for offshore resales of securities by persons other than
issuers, distributors, and some of their affiliates. See Regulation S Safe Harbors, supra
note 73, at *9. The requirement that the transaction be offshore with no directed selling
efforts also applies. See Regulation S, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,319 (1990). In addition,
the Regulation requires that if the securities being resold were not part of the issuer safe
harbor and if the resale is made before the expiration of any restricted period, the securi-
ties professional may not knowingly offer or sell them to a United States person. See id.
Finally, the seller may be required to send a confirmation to the purchaser listing the
applicable restrictions, if the seller knows the purchaser is a securities professional. See
idL The SEC announced, in a staff release, that issuers who offered securities prior to the
adoption of Regulation S must comply with prior restrictions under Release 33-4708.
See Staff Issues Interpretation, supra note 73, at 1503. Resales sold prior to the Regula-
tion's adoption, however, may now rely on the new resale safe harbors. See id. at 1504.
75. See Regulation S, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,307 (1990).
76. The SEC and United States investors anticipated that Rule 144A would be used
in conjunction with Regulation S, where "issuers [c]ould offer a tranche of securities in
their home markets, relying on Regulation S.... [and then] place a tranche of securities
in the United States by selling the securities to an intermediary that would then resell
them in reliance on Rule 144A." Right Rules, Wrong Timing, supra note 50, at *4. In
addition, the SEC expected that the resale safe harbor could permit more efficient off-
shore resale of certain restricted securities sold in the United States, making United States
restricted securities more attractive. See Right Rules, Wrong Timing, supra note 50, at $3.
77. According to Citibank, which has set up a funding instrument called the GDR,
issuers can now "raise capital simultaneously in both the U.S. private market and the non
U.S. public markets also without the lengthy SEC registration and disclosure process" by
using Regulation S in conjunction with Rule 144A Citibank Answers Questions, supra
note 66, at *2. By using Regulation S, GDRs are offered to persons outside the United
States in offshore transactions and to QIBs in the United States through Rule 144A. See
id The GDR "provides for cross market fungibility, increased liquidity, multicurrency
trading, greater settlement efficiency and a means by which to tap the global investment
community through the issuance of one security." Id (emphasis added).
78. See Right Rules, Wrong Timing, supra note 50, at *4. Examples of transactions
using Rule 144A in conjunction with offerings abroad are numerous. For example,
Cemex, a cement producer, is expected to launch a $300 million Eurobond issue, "with a
tranche for placement in the US, under Rule 144A." Corrigan, Borrowers Rediscover the
Capital Markets, Fin. Times, Apr. 5, 1991, § 1, at 30, col. 3. In addition, a Mexican
cement producer, Apasco, placed $50 million of convertible subordinated debentures
abroad and in the United States under Rule 144A. See Fidler, An Open Season for Con-
vertibles, Fin. Times, May 22, 1991, § 1, at 27, col. 6. Also, Italy's telecommunications
holding company, IRI, placed an international equity offering of S275 million which in-
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B. Analysis of Recent Criticisms of Rule 144A
When the SEC adopted Rule 144A, it recognized that problems could
arise in the future, in particular with respect to: (1) the nature and
number of regular participants in the private placement market; (2) the
extent of foreign issuer participation; and (3) the effect of Rule 144A on
the public market.79 Although the third concern-leakage of privately
placed securities into the public market-has not yet been a problem, s°
much debate has arisen as to whether Rule 144A has sufficiently in-
creased the number of foreign issues in the United States.81
Commentators have suggested several possible amendments to in-
crease the effectiveness of Rule 144A in attracting foreign issuers to the
United States market.8" Some of the recommended changes are valid
and must be considered. Other commentators, however, have suggested
alternative limitations beyond the Rule itself to explain a possible stifling
of the Rule's effects on the United States capital markets. For example,
one commentator discredits criticisms about Rule 144A in light of the
Rule's success in achieving the "facilitat[ion of] mutual access between
U.S. institutional investors and foreign securities issuers."8 3 Others ex-
plain that market conditions have on the whole been "terrible ' 84 and
cluded an offer in the United States as a private placement under Rule 144A. See Webb,
STET Plans Deal of $275m to Cut State Holding, Fin. Times, June 12, 1991, § 1, at 29,
col. 1.
79. See Rule 144A, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933, 17,934 (1990) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144A).
80. See SEC Report on Rule 144A Gets Failing Grade; GAO Asked to Tutor Agency,
Sec. Week, Mar. 11, 1991, at *1, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
81. Several commentators have suggested that Rule 144A has proved deficient in at-
tracting foreign companies to United States markets. See Rule 144A Deemed Disap-
pointing One Year After Implementation, Int'l Fin. Daily (BNA), at *1 (July 25, 1991),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File [hereinafter Rule 144A Deemed Disap-
pointing]. Again, there are many commentators who hold, to the contrary, that foreign
issuer participation, with or without Rule 144A, is quite substantial. See supra notes 64-
78 and accompanying text. One such commentator is Richard Breeden, Chairman of the
SEC, who has stated, "In the last two years, 135 foreign issuers have entered the US
disclosure system for the first time .... So the suggestion that foreign companies aren't
coming to US markets is just simply factually untrue." Hearing of the House Telecom-
munications & Finance Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee,
reprinted in Fed. Info. Sys. Corp., May 2, 1991, at *9, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
OMNI File [hereinafter Telecommunications & Fin. Hearing]. Breeden did, however, go
on to say that "we want to see [more] foreign companies come here." Id. Furthermore,
Representative Rinaldo responded to the chairman's optimistic statement with, "the fact
of the matter is we do lose some companies that we would like to have here." Id.
82. For discussion of reasons given for the infrequent use of Rule 144A, see infra
notes 87-133 and accompanying text.
83. Misperceptions, supra note 12, at 16. This commentator asserts that there have
been many misperceptions about what Rule 144A was really intended to accomplish, the
most relevant being the misperception that "liquidity can be achieved merely by removal
of regulatory impediments to free transferability." Id. "[L]iquidity requires [instead]
market breadth and a steady and reliable flow of timely public information." Id. These
elements require the effort of market participants and the maturity of the market itself.
84. See US Private Placements Hampered by Economic Concern, Reuters, Dec. 7,
1990, at *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
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that private placements in general have decreased from prior levels."s
These commentators hold an optimistic view for Rule 144A's future, em-
phasizing that, most importantly, the Rule needs time to be fully eflec-
tive.s6 Nonetheless, criticisms leveled against technical aspects of Rule
144A should be addressed by the SEC in order to increase the Rule's
effectiveness.
1. The Definition of QIB May Be Too Narrow
Many commentators have complained that the definition of QIB is too
narrow, thus excluding potential investors and failing to meet the de-
mands of foreign companies.8 7 The Rule, as originally proposed, would
have provided a safe harbor for three categories of transactions, varying
in their definitions of eligible QIBs and securities.8" The SEC, however,
decided that it would be best to phase in Rule 144A therefore, the Rule
was made available only to large institutional buyers.8 9 Although the
SEC chose a definition of QIB based on its adherence to protective pol-
icy-making, the criticisms of the definition are numerous.
Some financial professionals believe that the limited QIB definition de-
ters many foreign companies who do not want to market their securities
only to large United States investors. Instead, foreign issuers would pre-
fer the definition to include smaller institutions and individuals."° Others
claim that the narrow definition has resulted in extensive use of the Reg-
85. See Glover, Good Intentions in a Bad Economy, Legal Times, Dec. 31, 1990, at 20,
21 [hereinafter Good Intentions]; The Public World of Private Placements, Economist,
Sept. 22, 1990, at 86 [hereinafter Public World of Private Placements]. In the first half of
1991, in dollar figures, United States private placements totalled 49.6 billion whereas in
the first half of 1990 this figure was 62.3 billion-20% higher. See Swimmer, US Private
Placement Market Outlook Strong Goldman, Reuters, Oct. 30, 1991, at *2, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File. According to Moody's Investors Service, as "con-
trast[ed] to the traditional private placement debt market" there has been strong growth
in the 144A private placement market. U.S. 144A Private Placements Up, supra note 64,
at *1.
86. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
87. See. e.g., Rule 144A Deemed Disappointing, supra note 81, at '1; Glover, Some
Assembly Required- Given Time and a Little Adjustment New SEC Rules May Become
Powerful Capital-Raising Tools, Recorder, Jan. 24, 1991, at *2, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, PAPERS File [hereinafter Some Assembly Required]; A Closer Look, supra note
56, at *8.
88. See Proposed Rule 144A, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,076 (1989) (citing Rule 144A Propos-
ing Release, 53 Fed. Reg. 44,016 (1988).
89. SEC policies must be careful not to "sacrific[e] the investor protection principles
of U.S securities laws." Boosting US. Capital Markets, supra note 5, at $2.
In a proposal to Rule 144A, the Commission stated that it "ha[d] attempted to estab-
lish a level at which it can be confident that participating investors have extensive experi-
ence in the private resale market for restricted securities." See Rule 144A Proposing
Release, 53 Fed. Reg. 44,016, 44,028 (1988). The Commission essentially sought to
"identify a class of investors that can be conclusively assumed to be sophisticated and in
little need of the protection afforded by the ['33 Act's] registration provisions." Id
90. See Does 144A Threaten the Standardization of Accounting Statements?, Institu-
tional Investor, Aug. 1990, at 118.
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ulation S resale market91 instead of the Rule 144A resale market.92 Crit-
ics of the Rule's definition also emphasize that eligible 144A purchasers
are precisely those buyers who were not concerned about liquidity and
therefore bought less-liquid securities prior to the Rule.93 Thus, many of
the QIBs in the 144A market were not affected by the problems that led
to promulgation of the Rule in the first place. 94 Rather, those institu-
tions that want to purchase 144A securities, such as money managers
and smaller insurance companies, are still unable to do so.95
Commentators have suggested that the SEC broaden the definition to
benefit excluded investors by: (1) decreasing the $100 million standard
for QIB status;96 (2) including currently excluded government and other
securities in calculating the $100 million standard;97 (3) expanding the
QIB definition "to include a QIB that purchases a security for the ac-
count of a non-QIB, if the account is one over which the QIB has invest-
ment discretion";98 and (4) including bank-managed trust accounts and
insurance company-managed separate accounts as eligible QIBs.9 9 In or-
der to increase the types of investors utilizing 144A, the SEC should
broaden the definition of QIB. Indeed, the SEC has already requested
comments on the appropriateness of the present QIB standard."o° In
light of the numerous calls for change,"'1 the SEC must reevaluate Rule
144A and determine whether the definition can now be expanded.
2. Rule 144A Disclosure Requirements May Still Be Too Stringent
For Foreign Issuers
While the Rule 144A disclosure requirement is not as extensive as that
for a public offering, critics have suggested that the requirement remains
91. For a discussion of the Regulation S resale market, see supra notes 73-74 and
accompanying text.
92. See Misperceptions, supra note 12, at 16.
93. See Picker, Will the 144A Market Be Slow Off The Mark?, Institutional Investor,
May 1990, at 25 [hereinafter Slow Off the Mark?]; Thumbs Up For Rule 144A, supra note
52, at 10. For a discussion of eligible institutional buyers under Rule 144A, see supra
notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
94. See Slow Off the Mark?, supra note 93, at 25.
95. See id.
96. A managing director at Morgan Stanley & Co. suggested that the requirement be
reduced to $50 million. See Rule 144A Deemed Disappointing, supra note 81, at * 1.
97. See Some Assembly Required, supra note 87, *2.
98. A Closer Look, supra note 56, at *8.
99. See McLaughlin, Identifying 'QIB's' Under SEC Rule 144A, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 20,
1990, at 5, col. 1.
100. See Rule 144A, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933, 17,936 (1990). The Rule, as adopted, re-
quires that QIBs meet the $100 million threshold by investing in, rather than merely
having assets worth, the required amount of securities. See id. The SEC believed that
any subsequent suggestions by commentators to lower the threshold, to $50 or $25 mil-
lion, for example, would therefore prove that those commentators must have felt the
"investing in" standard was a sufficient safeguard. See Proposed Rule 144A, 54 Fed.
Reg. 30,076, 30,079 (1989).
101. See supra notes 87-99.
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burdensome.1"2 Some foreign issuers are reluctant to enter the United
States capital markets because the Rule requires disclosure of considera-
ble information, may require regular updating, and may subject issuers to
fraud liability if they fail to update disclosed information."0 '
Although arguments have been made in favor of further easing the
disclosure requirement under Rule 144A, the Rule's requirement should
not be changed. First, these arguments may be based on the false as-
sumption that investors want less information about issuers. Investors
have asserted that they will not accept "stingy disclosure" from issuers
even though they are indeed interested in Rule 144A securities."m If
QIBs are unsure of the information they receive from issuers, they may
102. See Good Intentions, supra note 85, at 21. This view was expressed by SEC Com-
missioner Fleischman in his dissent written upon the adoption of Rule 144A. See Rule
144A, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933, 17,947 (1990).
The Commissioner stated four reasons why an information requirement should not
have been included in the Rule. First, the information requirement undermines the prin-
ciple behind the proposal to Rule 144A-the notion that institutional investors can "fend
for themselves." See id. Indeed, in Rule 144A's proposal, the SEC goes through a rather
extensive look at legislative history to show the distinction between protecting individuals
and protecting institutional investors. See Proposed Rule 144A, 53 Fed. Reg. 44,016,
44,023 (1988). In fact, the original proposal of the Rule did not require issuers to provide
buyers with any information about the securities sold. See Rule 144A, 55 Fed. Reg.
17,933, 17,947 (1990). Commissioner Fleischman, in his dissent, proposed that the infor-
mation requirement be stricken in accordance with the original proposal of the Rule. See
id
Second, Commissioner Fleischman anticipated that, because many securities held
under rules prior to Rule 144A would be inappropriate for the Rule 144A market, their
attempted resales would "either abort in midstream or struggle forward in the
paperwork-burdened pre-Rule 144A manner." Id Furthermore, the Commissioner
stated, any prospective Rule 144A transactions would proceed slowly as a purchaser de-
termines whether it wants the requested information and, if so, then waits to receive it.
See id. The Commissioner explained that this procedure, although not foreign to pre-
144A transactions, inherently contradicts the "thrust" of the Rule's justification-that
purchasers must realize for themselves an issuer's Rule 144A reliance. See id.
Third, Commissioner Fleischman argued that issuers are reluctant to use the 144A
exemption because they fear possible anti-fraud liability under the Rule if they fail to
update the information they provide to purchasers. See id at 17,948. According to the
Commissioner, the information requirement will have at least three undesirable results:
(1) the provocation of requests for the material mandated by the section; (2) issuer in-
volvement beyond its traditional function of "merely reviewing the transaction for lawful-
ness prior to registration of transfer;," and (3) an automatic assumption that updating of
material is obligatory. See i. Issuers, sellers, and purchasers would assume obligatory
updating so as not to violate Sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the '33 Act-the antifraud provi-
sions. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 1(2), 77q(a) (1988)).
Finally, the Commissioner posed an administrative argument. He claimed that, con-
trary to the Administrative Procedure Act's requirements on informal rulemaking, ex-
pressed concerns of many commentators (that either the information requirements
should be deleted or that the requirements should be placed on someone other than the
sellers) had been disregarded by the Commission. See Rule 144A, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933,
17,948 (1990) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A).
103. See Good Intentions, supra note 85, at 21; Some Assembly Required, supra note 87,
at *1.
104. See Henriques, A Shortcut for Foreign Firms? Investors Say No, N.Y. Times, Sept.
15, 1991, at 13 (Money), col. 3.
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in fact be reluctant to buy 144A securities.10 5
Second, decreasing the disclosure requirement to the level under Rule
144A may have already increased the possibility of issuer or investor lia-
bility. 1 6 Also, an easing of disclosure requirements may increase fraud
and result in a concomitant increase in the burden of securities regulation
and enforcement placed upon the individual states in the UnitedStates. 0 7
A minimum information requirement108 balances the need for buyer
confidence and facilitates increased transactions. To further relax the in-
formation requirement would require the SEC to forego one of the un-
derlying policies of the '33 Act-that disclosure is essential in the
issuance of securities."°9 Alterations in Rule 144A should not undermine
the SEC's paramount goal: protecting investors.1 0
Furthermore, Rule 144A is still essentially new,' 1 and therefore tech-
nical amendments, such as expanding the definition of QIB, should be
adopted before those that would jeopardize SEC policies of investor
protection.
3. Issuer Liability for Resales Made Without Compliance With 144A
or Other Registration Requirements
Another criticism of Rule 144A is that issuers are unsure of their lia-
bility for resales made by investors without compliance with the Rule or
another exemption. "2 Specifically, while Rule 144A permits transac-
tions that do not involve public offerings pursuant to Section 4(2) of the
'33 Act,' 1 3 would a subsequent sale by the purchaser made outside the
105. See A Closer Look, supra note 56, at *5. "[D]oubts on the verification of the
original issuance of Rule 144A securities could seriously impair the goal of liquidity of
the Rule 144A market." Id.
106. See generally SEC Rule May Be First Step, supra note 35, at *2 (the tendency of
Rule 144A to relax disclosure levels in the market could result in issuer or investor liabil-
ity). For discussion of liability concerns, see infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
107. See Perry, States Wary SEC Rule Would Lower U.S. Standards, Reuters, Oct. 23,
1991, at *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
108. The information requirement under Rule 144A is no more extensive than neces-
sary. See A Closer Look, supra note 56, at *4. This commentator argues that the "rea-
sonably current" requirement is actually fairly limited because it only relates to specific
periods and because virtually all issuers would also desire that such information is cor-
rect. See id.
109. See Capital Markets in Transition, supra note 1, at 247. For a discussion of SEC
investor protection policies see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
110. The SEC must maintain 'due regard' for investor protection, according to statute.
See Hazen, supra note 14, at 295 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78q(A)-l(1)).
11. See Good Intentions, supra note 85, at 21. One expert predicts that in 1992 the
Rule will have fulfilled SEC and investor expectations. See Slow Start, supra note 49, at
D10, col. 4. Another explained, "Everyone sort of expected [Rule] 144A ... [to] be up
and running in a few months. That is not how these types of changes work. Even the
Euromarkets... took several years to develop." Id. at D10, col. 2.
112. See SEC Rule May Be First Step, supra note 35, at *2.
113. The SEC has indicated that if securities are sold pursuant to the Section 4(2)
exemption and then resold to QIBs pursuant to Rule 144A, the initial exemption will not
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Rule's safe harbor-one that enters the public market-vitiate the ex-
emption? Furthermore, who would be liable?"I4
These questions regarding liability for subsequent resales that are
made outside the Rule 144A exemption or other regulations may also
explain why foreign companies are reluctant to enter United States mar-
kets.115 Although SEC reports have shown that very few, if any, 144A
securities have entered the public market thus far," 6 these securities
could enter the public market in the future. Foreign companies are thus
justifiably concerned, and the SEC should resolve this issue.
4. Problems of Foreign Investment Companies
Rule 144A has also presented problems when foreign investment com-
panies, which underwrite the majority of foreign securities, are involved.
Although Rule 144A liberalizes disclosure requirements for foreign issu-
ers, foreign investment companies must comply with the Investment
Company Act of 1940.117
Because foreign investment companies are "prohibit[ed] from using [a
United States] jurisdictional means to offer or sell [their] securities in
connection with a public offering in the [United States],""' they are
faced with two alternatives. A foreign investment company can either
form a separate, mirror United States investment company and offer that
company's securities, 1 9 or it can privately place its securities.' 20
In choosing private placements, investment companies have often
made simultaneous public offerings of the securities in foreign exchange
markets. 21 The SEC, however, in the release adopting Rule 144A, 11
asserted that if there were more than 100 United States beneficial owners
of a foreign investment company's securities following a private place-
ment, those companies would have to apply for an order to register under
the Investment Company Act of 1940.123 The SEC has not resolved
be jeopardized. See Right Rules, Wrong Timing, supra note 50, at *3. For a discussion of
the Section 4(2) exemption, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
114. See SEC Rule May Be First Step, supra note 35, at *2; Keeping the Us Competi-
tive, supra note 20, at *8; Good Intentions, supra note 85, at 21.
115. See SEC Rule May Be First Step, supra note 35, at *2.
116. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
117. Foreign investment companies must adhere to the requirements in Section 7(d) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d) (1988).
118. Sherman, Restrictions on the Activities of Foreign Investment Companies in the
US., 5 L. & Bus. Insights (P-H) No. 5, May 1991, at 30, *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, NWLTRS File (referring to Section 7(d) of the Investment Company Act of
1940) [hereinafter Restrictions on the Activities].
119. The SEC urged this procedure because it recognized that the legal and regulatory
environment in which foreign investment companies operate, in addition to Section 7(d)
requirements, is problematic. See id. at *1 (citing SEC Release No. IC-13691 (Dec. 23,
1983)).
120. See id at *2.
121. See id
122. See Rule 144A, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933 (1990) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A).
123. See id at 17,940-41.
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whether secondary trading following the private placement should be in-
cluded in calculating the 100-owner limit. 124 Foreign investment compa-
nies have great difficulty enforcing regulations that are strict enough to
assure compliance with the 100-beneficial owner test if the test is inter-
preted to include secondary trading.125 Many foreign companies thus
refuse to offer their securities in the United States.126 Commentators
have described the 100-beneficial owner policy 27 as "contrary to current
Commission policies recognizing the increased globalization, and encour-
aging the liberalization, of international securities markets."' 28 There-
fore, these commentators have suggested that the SEC abandon this
policy. Since the policy is an obvious deterrent to foreign investment in
the United States, this problem must be resolved.
5. Possible Liability Under Rule 10b-6
Another difficulty with Rule 144A arises when the Rule is used in con-
junction with Regulation S.129 The problem is that the SEC might apply
Rule lOb-6 of the '34 Act to underwriters taking part in two-tranche
deals. 130 According to SEC materials, "Rule 10b-6 prohibits persons
participating in a distribution from bidding for or purchasing the security
being distributed, or a related security, during the distribution."' 13 1
Often, foreign underwriters conduct market-making activities that Rule
10b-6 would prohibit if performed in the United States. 32  Recently,
however, the SEC granted certain limited exemptions to Rule 10b-6. 133
124. See Restrictions on the Activities, supra note 118, at *3; Good Intentions, supra
note 85, at 21. The SEC has declined to assure foreign investment companies that no
enforcement action will be taken if secondary-market trading results in surpassing the
100 owner limit. See Restrictions on the Activities, supra note 118, at *3 (citing Alpha
Finance Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, n.4 (July 27, 1990)).
125. See Restrictions on the Activities, supra note 118, at *3.
126. See id.
127. Prior policies were set out in the Touche, Remnant & Co. no-action letter.
Touche, Remnant & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 27, 1984), available in LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, NOACT File. This no-action letter states, "a foreign investment com-
pany ... mak[ing] an offering in the U.S.... would be subject to the 1940 Act if upon
completion of the offering there would be more than 100 persons resident in the U.S. who
were beneficial owners of the securities." Id. at * 1-*2 (footnotes omitted).
128. Restrictions on the Activities, supra note 118, at *5. This commentary holds that
Section 7(d) only prohibits foreign investment companies from making public offerings if
organized in accordance with the foreign jurisdiction's laws, and that Section 7, as the
only section applicable to foreign investment companies, does not affect a company's abil-
ity to privately place its securities in the United States. See id. at *4.
129. See Good Intentions, supra note 85, at 21.
130. See id.
131. New Notification Requirements for Certain Exemptions From Rules 10b-6, lOb-
7, and 10b-8, File No. 270-31, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,060 (1991) [hereinafter Exemption From
Rule lOb-6].
132. See Good Intentions, supra note 85, at 21.
133. The SEC has recently granted an exemption for distributions pursuant to transac-
tions exempt from the '33 Act:
Exemptions from Rules lOb-6 . . . have been granted to permit non-U.S.
transactions during the period where foreign securities eligible under Rule 144A
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The SEC predicted that, had the exemption been enacted in 1990, ten
other transactions would have qualified.'" The SEC should therefore
continue to respond to the suggestions posed by issuers and investors.
C. Additional Developments
Rule 144A utilized one route-resales in the private placement mar-
ket-to attract foreign companies. To further the United States role in
international markets, the SEC may facilitate changes in the public mar-
ket. 35 Currently, foreign companies that list their securities on a public
exchange or NASDAQ in the United States must still register their se-
curities in adherence to SEC disclosure requirements.' 36
An avenue that the SEC has already pursued with Canada'37 is use of
are being offered and sold in the U.S. to [QIBs] . . .. provided that: (a) the non-
U.S. transactions are effected on the ISE (on the SEAQ or SEAQ International
systems), or on the Montreal, Paris, Tokyo, or Toronto Stock Exchanges; and
(b) in addition to [having voting stock with an aggregate market value of at least
U.S. $150 million held worldwide by non-atfiliates] the issuer has an operating
history of at least three years.
Securities Industry Association, No-Action Letter, at *5 (Apr. 25, 1991), available in
LEXIS Library, NOACT File; see also Exemption From Rule lOb-6, supra note 131, 56
Fed. Reg. at 20,061 ("[t]ransactions conducted in compliance with rule lOb-7 are ex-
cepted from rule lOb-6"). The interpretive letter issued by the SEC provided two types of
exemptive relief. See SEC Okays Conditional Exemptive Relief for Non-U.S. Offerings,
Rights Offers, 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.17, at 589 (Apr. 26, 1991) [hereinafter
Conditional Exemptive RelieA. The first exemption, applicable to "non-registered distri-
butions by foreign issuers to U.S. institutional investors.... appl[ies] to Rule 144A trans-
actions and certain other types of private placements." Id The second exemption
allows rights offerings ("offers of new stock made to existing shareholders, usually at a
discount from the price to be offered to the public") to be made without meeting registra-
tion requirements. Id at 590. Under either exemption, the securities must be currently
traded on five foreign exchanges in London, Paris, Tokyo, Toronto, or Montreal, and
must meet five other conditions. See id Specifically:
(1) the transaction must involve a distribution of foreign securities outside the
United States; (2) the transaction also must be made outside the United States;
(3) the foreign issuer must have voting shares held by non-affiliates with a mar-
ket value of at least $150 million; (4) anyone using either exemption must notify
the SEC of their actions; and (5) the transaction may not involve sales by issu-
ers' affiliates. In addition, the foreign issuer must have an operating history for
at least three years.
Id
134. See Conditional Exemptive Relief, supra note 133, at 590.
135. See Need for Disclosure Rule Changes, supra note 26, at 1592. There have gener-
ally been few public offerings of foreign securities in the United States. See id For a
discussion of why foreign companies avoid United States public markets see supra notes
31-36 and accompanying text.
136. See Karmel, Minimal Steps Toward Mutual Recognition for Foreign Issuers,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 1991, at 3, col. 1.
137. A "multi-jurisdictional disclosure system" ("MJDS") between the United States
and Canada was approved by the SEC on May 30, 1991 and by the individual commis-
sions in Canada's provinces by June 1991. See Securities Sales Eased in Cross-Border
Deals, Amer. Banker-Bond Buyer, July 22, 1991, at *1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, FIN File [hereinafter Securities Sales Eased]. Under the MJDS, certain United
States and Canadian companies are able to "sell securities in each other's markets with-
1992] S199
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
a cross-jurisdictional disclosure system under the theory of mutual recog-
nition.138 Generally, a cross-jurisdictional disclosure agreement means
that eligible companies may sell securities in another country by relying
on documents filed in their home countries. 139 The goal of such an
agreement is "to lower the cost for companies to raise capital domesti-
cally and internationally."'" These agreements, based on an expansion
of Rule 12g3-2(b)1 ' to include other securities defined by the SEC, are
one aspect of mutual recognition.142 The SEC has also considered estab-
lishing international accounting standards for disclosure requirements
under a similar approach. 143 Extending mutual recognition to other for-
eign countries has been heavily debated and has been strongly considered
by the SEC and other financial experts. 1" If such agreements are estab-
out going through the expensive and time-consuming process of filing disclosure docu-
ments related to cross border offerings." Id.
The terms of the U.S.-Canada MJDS include: its limitation to Canadian 'substantial
issuers' with a large market following, the requirement that a Canadian issuer have a
reporting history with a Canadian securities commission of at least three years, and the
requirement that an issuer be listed on one of the three Canadian stock exchanges for a
minimum of one year. See SEC Approves Rules Aimed at Promoting Cross-Border Offer-
ings with Canadians, Int'l Fin. Daily (BNA), at *-*2 (May 31, 1991), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTL File. Furthermore, for an equity offering the SEC requires
"that the Canadian concern meet the $75 million (Canadian) float test and the three-year
reporting test.... [and] have to have $360 million (Canadian) in market value." Id. at
*2. For a rights offering, a Canadian company "would have to meet the market value,
float, and reporting tests.... and have to be listed on one of the three Canadian ex-
changes for at least three years.... [or] could be listed on an exchange for only one year"
if it had three years reporting history. Id.
Essentially, such an agreement between the United States and Canada is possible be-
cause they "have many disclosure requirements in common" and their systems "share the
common purpose of ensuring that investors are given information adequate to make an
informed investment decision." Securities Sales Eased, supra, at *1 (comments by Linda
Quinn, director of the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance.).
138. See Karmel, supra note 136, at 3, col. 2.
139. See id. at 4, col. 4; SEC Approves MJDS System With Canada; Canadian Provinces
to Sign This Month, 4 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. No. 13, at 1 (June 3, 1991) [hereinafter SEC
Approves MJDS].
140. SEC Approves MJDS, supra note 139, at 1.
141. See supra note 32 discussing Rule 12g3-2(b).
142. See Karmel, supra note 136, at 3, col. 2.
143. See id.; Need For Disclosure Rule Changes, supra note 26, at 1592. The former
chief of the SEC's Office of International Corporate Finance, Sarah Hanks, has expressed
the view that, in the face of globalization of securities, the United States must give way
and accept foreign disclosure standards. See Need For Disclosure Rule Changes, supra
note 26, at 1592. Specifically, Ms. Hanks advocates that, in accounting standards, quar-
terly reporting must be eradicated and replaced with semi-annual reporting. See id.
SEC Chairman Richard Breeden has stated that he "believe[s] that we will have a
nucleus of international accounting standards sometime in 1992." Telecommunications
& Fin. Hearing, supra note 81 at *9. General Counsel to the SEC, James R. Doty, has
reiterated that the SEC is "actively engaged in efforts to increase harmonization of world
accounting standards and will continue these efforts." Doty, supra note 1, at S89.
144. See Karmel, supra note 136, at 3, col. 1; see also, Need for Disclosure Rule
Changes, supra note 26, at 1592 ("the United States must begin to "'accept overseas
disclosure standards' "). SEC Chairman Richard Breeden said "he was interested in pur-
suing a similar cross-border offering system with Mexico, possibly as part of the U.S.-
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lished between the United States and other foreign countries, these
changes will further improve the position of the United States in the
changing global economy.
CONCLUSION
Rule 144A appears to have helped the United States maintain its im-
portance in the world financial markets by increasing access for foreign
issuers to United States capital markets. This change reflects a well-
planned response to the evolving international economy. Further
changes, however, are still necessary. The SEC must address several spe-
cific areas-the definition of QIB, the relaxation of disclosure standards,
issuer liability for subsequent resales, and the problems of foreign invest-
ment companies-that have left both United States investors and foreign
issuers unsatisfied. This Note has focused on those problems with the
Rule that affect the competitive position of the United States in the inter-
national securities market. In the above areas, with the exception of fur-
ther relaxation of disclosure requirements, amendments should be
considered in order to expand the Rule 144A market.
Mexico free-trade agreement." Securities Sales Eased, supra note 137, at *1. Manning
Warren III, a University of Louisville law professor, firmly opposes these views, and
believes, rather, that reduced disclosure methods, including Rule 144A, "when viewed 'in
isolation, appear reasonable,' but collectively constitute a 'chipping away of disclosure
standards."' Need for Disclosure Rule Changes, supra note 26, at 1592.
For a discussion of the recent developments in such proposals, see SEC's Proposed
Regulations, supra note 12, at S203.
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